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Gellis: Trial Judge Required, upon Proper Request, to Instruct Jury Not t

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Jury Instructions-Trial Judge
Required, Upon Proper Request, To Instruct Jury Not to
Draw Adverse Inferences From a Defendant's Failure to
Testify.
-U.S.-,

Carter v. Kentucky,
101 S. Ct. 1112, 67 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1981).

Lonnie Joe Carter was indicted for third degree burglary of a hardware
store and was later found to be a habitual felony offender. At trial, Carter
chose not to testify, since doing so would enable the prosecution to introduce his prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Carter's attorney
requested an instruction be given to the jury directing them to refrain
from drawing adverse conclusions from his client's failure to take the
stand.' The request was denied, and Carter was subsequently convicted.2
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed. s The United States
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to determine whether the
Constitution compels a criminal trial judge to give an instruction such as
that requested by Carter's attorney.4 Held-Reversed and remanded. A
trial judge is required, upon proper request, to instruct the jury not to
draw adverse inferences from a defendant's failure to testify.'
The objective of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination6 is to insure that an individual is not compelled, when acting as a
1. Carter v. Kentucky, -. U.S..... ,101 S. Ct. 1112, 1115-16, 67 L. Ed. 2d 241, 246
(1981). Carter requested the jury be instructed: "The defendant is not compelled to testify
and the fact that he does not cannot be used as inference of guilt and should not prejudice
him in any way." Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1115-16, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 246.
2. Id. at __, 101 S. Ct. at 1116, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 246-47. Carter was found gu;lty by the
jury as a persistent offender and sentenced to the maximum prison term of twenty years. Id.
at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1116, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 247.
3. Id. at -_, 101 S. Ct. at 1113, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 243. Concluding that the trial court did
not commit error by refusing an instruction to the jury regarding Carter's right not to testify, the Kentucky Supreme Court pointed to section 421.225 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes which provides: "In any criminal or penal prosecution the defendant, on his own request, shall be allowed to testify in his own behalf, but his failure to do so shall not be
commented upon or create any presumption against him." Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.225 (Supp.
1980); see Carter v. Kentucky, -U.S..... -, 101 S. Ct. 1112, 1116, 67 L. Ed. 2d 241, 247
(1981).
4. See Carter v. Kenutcky, -U.S.-,
-, 101 S. Ct. 1112, 1116-17, 67 L. Ed. 2d 241,
247-48.
5. Id. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 1121-22, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 254 (1981).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment commands, in pertinent part, that no
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witness, to give testimony that is likely to incriminate him.7 The fifth
amendment is predicated upon the assumption that innocent people
might be convicted if forced to testify at their own trials8 and thus, the
privilege includes the right to remain silent.9 Furthermore, the fifth
amendment guarantees that neither the prosecution nor the court may
insinuate that the jury should come to adverse conclusions based upon a
defendant's failure to testify.10 To protect this constitutional right, courts
have construed this provision liberally, in favor of an accused.11 In Bruno

person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id.
7. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); United States v. Gordon, 236
F.2d 916, 919 (2nd Cir. 1956); Williams v. State, 607 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980).
8. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965). An individual may have justifiable
reasons for choosing not to testify which bear no relation to fear of disclosing guilt. See, e.g.,
Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 344 (1978) (fear of incriminating people whom defendant
either fears or loves); Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893) (fear of demeanor
giving unfavorable impression on witness stand); People v. Modesto, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 398
P.2d 753, 763 (Calif. 1965) (fear of disclosure of prior convictions during cross-examination).
Excessive timidity and nervousness may embarrass and confuse an innocent defendant so as
to increase, instead of remove, prejudices against him. See Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S.
60, 66 (1893). Although the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
may shelter the guilty, it often protects innocent people accused of crime who fear selfincrimination, contempt, or perjury. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55
(1964); Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893).
9. See Lefkowitz.v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); United States v. Gordon, 236 F.2d
916, 919 (2nd Cir. 1956); Williams v. Texas, 607 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
10. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965) (unconstitutional compulsion exists when prosecutor and court insinuate that jury should draw unfavorable inferences from defendant's silence); United States v. Sorzano, 602 F.2d 1201, 1202 (5th Cir.
1979) (unfavorable comment on defendant's failure to testify is prohibited by fifth amendment), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018; Brumfield v. State, 445 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1969) (adverse inferences may not be drawn from defendant's silence and comment on
such silence is prohibited). Moreover, counsel for a co-defendant is prohibited from commenting on the defendant's failure to testify. See DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140,
141 (5th Cir. 1962).
11. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461 (1975) (fifth amendment privilege is afforded broad construction for benefit of individual); United States v. Mahady, 512 F.2d 521,
525 (3rd Cir. 1975) (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)) (privilege
against self-incrimination must be given liberal construction to protect right it was intended
to secure). In 1964, the Supreme Court established that the privilege provided the criminal
defendant the same protections in state prosecutions as in federal prosecutions. See Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). The Malloy Court overruled both Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78 (1908) and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), which held the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination would not be made applicable to the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). See also McGuffin v. State, 571 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ) (in Texas criminal
prosecutions, fifth amendment applies by virtue of due process clause of fourteenth
amendment).
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v. United States,' 2 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of jury instructions concerning a defendant's silence. 3 The Bruno Court interpreted a federal statute 4 as requiring federal judges, upon the request of
the defendant, to advise the jury of the defendant's right to remain silent
and the absence of any inference of guilt resulting therefrom. 5 The
Court's ruling, however, was predicated on statutory construction and the
traditional duty of the trial judge to instruct the jury on pertinent issues
in a case, rather than on constitutional grounds.' Subsequently, the
Court in Griffin v. California17 held that comment by the prosecution or
instructions by the court that the defendant's failure to testify is indicative of guilt is violative of the United States Constitution. 8 Such adverse
comments or instructions are unconstitutional because they punish the
accused for exercising his constitutional right to remain silent, 9 and,
thus, undermine the purpose of the fifth amendment privilege."0

12. 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
13. See Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 292 (1939). The Court held an accused
should have the right to make the decision as to whether such instruction should be given
when a congressional act gives him a choice. Id. at 294.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1969). The legislative intent behind the federal statute involved in

Bruno was to allow an accused to choose whether or not a jury instruction will be given on
his right of silence. See 54 N.C.L. REV. 1001, 1004 (1976).The statute provides that in federal prosecutions "the person so charged shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be a
competent witness," and that "his failure to make such a request shall not create any presumption against him." 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1969).
15. See Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 293 (1939).
16. See id. at 294.
17. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
18. See id. at 615 (prosecution precluded from commenting on defendant's constitutionally protected right to remain silent). Although the Griffin rule proscribes comment on a
defendant's silence, it does not prohibit remarks that the defense has failed to present material evidence or remarks on the state of the evidence. See Bloom, The California Experience: Griffin v. California, 51 CALIF. S.B.J. 376, 376-77 (1976).
19. See, e.g., Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S. 593, 596 (1968) (comment on defendant's
silence violates fifth amendment); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967) (right not
to be punished for exercise of constitutional right of silence); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609, 614 (1965) (such comment limits the constitutional privilege to remain silent by making
it costly for accused to exercise that privilege). In a further move to protect these rights, the
Texas Legislature has enacted a similar provision which prohibits prejudicial comment concerning a defendant's silence. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 38.08 (Vernon 1979).
Article 38.08 provides: "Any defendant in any criminal action shall be permitted to testify
in his own behalf therein, but the failure of any defendant to so testify shall not be taken as
circumstance against him, nor shall the same be alluded to." Id.
20. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967); 62 MARQ. L. REV. 74, 80 (1978).
One criticism of allowing the prosecution to comment on a defendant's silence is that the
prosecution may use it as a substitute for evidence which would, therefore, encourage sloppy
police work. See D. FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TODAY, 321-22 (1976).
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The United States Supreme Court in Lakeside v. Oregon"1 determined
that it is constitutionally permissible for a trial judge to instruct a jury
not to draw unfavorable inferences from a defendant's failure to testify,
even if the defendant objects to the instruction."2 The Court reasoned
that such a rule would reduce the danger of jurors giving evidentiary
weight to a defendant's silence. s Furthermore, the Lakeside majority
held that the fifth and fourteenth amendments bar only adverse comment
on a defendant's failure to testify, and viewed an instruction to the jury
not to draw adverse inferences from a defendant's silence as a "comment
of an entirely different order." 4
In Carter v.Kentucky"5 the United States Supreme Court was faced
with the narrow question of whether a jury instruction not to draw inferences from a defendant's silence is constitutionally required when requested by the accused .2 The Court found that the failure to limit speculation on the significance of a defendant's silence when a proper request
is made for a precautionary instruction puts an impermissable burden on
the exercise of the fifth amendment privilege.27 Relying on its decision in
Lakeside, the Court concluded that the aim of the instruction was to
eliminate from the jury's deliberations any prejudicial inferences drawn
from the defendant's silence.2 The Court noted that a trial judge may
properly guard the constitutional right to remain silent through the appropriate use of jury instructions. 20 Ultimately, the majority held that a
trial judge must issue a "protective" instruction if properly requested by

21. 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
22. See id. at 340-41.
23. Id. at 339 (very purpose of instruction is to prevent jury from drawing inferences
from defendant's silence). The Lakeside Court emphasized that the purpose of the jury
charge is to direct the attention of the jurors to concepts such as burden of proof and reasonable doubt, and the instruction on the significance of the privilege against self-incrimination is not any different, Id. at 340.
24. See id. at 340-41. The defendant in Lakeside argued that instructing the jury to
disregard his silence is like "waving a red flag in front of the jury." Id. at 340. The Court
dismissed this argument because it was predicated on two speculative assumptions: (1) that
the jury failed to notice that he had not taken the stand and (2) that the jury would completely disregard the instruction and consider that which they had been told to disregard.
See id. at 340.
25. -. U.S.-.,
101 S. Ct. 1112, 67 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1981).
26. See id. at -' 101 S. Ct. at 1114, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 244.
27. See id. at
, 101 S. Ct. at 1121-22, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 254.
28. See id. at
, 101 S. Ct. at 1118-19, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 249-51; Lakeside v. Oregon, 435
U.S. 333, 339 (1979).
29. See Carter v. Kentucky, -. U.S.....
, 101 S. Ct. 1112, 1120-21, 67 L. Ed. 2d 241,
251-53 (1981). The Court reasoned juries are not made up of specialists in legal principles,
and it is predictable that jurors will speculate unfavorably upon a defendant's silence if they
are not properly instructed in the law. See id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1120, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 252.
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the defendant."0 The Court emphasized that a defense attorney's argument to the jury that the petitioner is not required to take the stand does
not have the same purging effect as an instruction given by the judge.31
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the majority holding should be limited to cases where the accused has requested the court
to instruct the jury not to infer guilt from his silence. He reasoned that
the issue of whether a failure-to-testify instruction should be given is similar to the issue of whether a defendant should testify, and, as such,
should be decided by the defendant rather than his lawyer or the state.3 2
Justice Powell, in a separate concurring opinion, found the holding to be
required by precedent and not by the Constitution. He argued that the
Court was expanding the concept of compulsion beyond reasonable limits.
Furthermore, the requirement of a failure-to-testify instruction stems
from the instruction that the defendant is presumed to be innocent,
rather than from the Constitution. 3
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Rehnquist contended that Carter was not
compelled to testify against his will or take the stand in violation of the
fifth amendment.3 There was, therefore, simply no unconstitutional compulsion involved at Carter's trial.3 8 Justice Rehnquist also stressed that
the procedural rules which apply to the administration of criminal justice
are a matter of local concern. se
The Carter Court correctly ruled the Constitution requires a trial judge
to give a failure-to-testify instruction to the jury when requested by a
defendant.8 7 Each defendant has an unconditional right to decide
whether to testify and should have a corresponding right to decide
whether his silence should be alluded to in front of the jury. 8 To achieve
30. Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1120, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 252; accord United States v. Bain, 596
F.2d 120, 122 (5th Cir. 1979) (refusal to give requested instruction is reversible error). If a
defendant does not take the witness stand, it is prejudicial error to deny a charge to the jury
that his silence is not indicative of guilt. White v. United States, 314 F.2d 243, 244 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
-,
101 S. Ct. 1112, 1120, 67 L. Ed. 2d 241,
31. See Carter v. Kentucky, -U.S.-,
252.
32. Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1123, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 255 (Stevens, J., concurring).
33. Id. at __, 101 S. Ct. at 1122, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 254. (Powell, J., concurring).
"[Niothing in the clause requires that jurors not draw logical inferences when a defendant
refuses to explain incriminating circumstances." Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1122, 67 L. Ed. 2d
at 255 (Powell, J., concurring).
34. Id. at __, 101 S. Ct. at 1123-24, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 256-57. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
, 101 S. Ct. at 1123-24, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 256-57 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at
36. Id. at __, 101 S. Ct. at 1124, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 257 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
37. See id. at -. , 101 S. Ct. at 1121-22, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 254; Russell v. State, 398
S.W.2d 213, 215 (Ark. 1966).
38. See Russell v. State, 398 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Ark. 1966); cf. United States v. Hudler,
605 F.2d 488, 490 (10th Cir. 1979) (accused is entitled to jury instructions regarding his
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this end, however, the discretion of the trial court in giving such jury
instructions must be limited.3 9 The decision to testify is a matter of trial
strategy, and, therefore, must be left to the accused.'0 Forcing the accused
to accept a failure-to-testify instruction over his objection infringes upon
the defendant's freedom to choose such a strategy, and, therefore, violates
his privilege against unconstitutional comment."'
The purging effect of a requested jury instruction such as that in
Carter demonstrates one method of securing a defendant's right to be
judged exclusively on the basis of evidence introduced at trial.' 2 One suspected of crime is entitled to have a finding of guilt or innocence based
only on proof admitted at trial, and not on the basis of silence which is
unrelated to such evidence. 43 Because a precautionary jury instruction
may have probative value, the fifth amendment guarantee against selfincrimination may be rendered worthless unless a no-inference instruction is given in cases where the defendant remains silent.4 On the other
hand, failure-to-testify instructions are arguably precluded by the fifth
amendment as they are inherently a "comment" on the silence of the accused. 4' The actual effect such instructions have on the jury and the ability of the jury to follow the court's admonitions is, therefore, uncertain."'

theory of case), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 961 (1980).
39. Gross v. State, 306 N.E.2d 371, 372 (Ind. 1974) (judicial statements regarding an
accused's silence must be closely regulated).
40. See Corpus v. Estelle, 571 F.2d 1378, 1381 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
957 (1978); Note, 57 ORE. L. REv. 613, 618 (1978).
41. See Russell v. State, 398 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Ark. 1966); Villinese v. State, 492 P.2d
343, 350 (Okla. 1971).
42. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 489 (1978) (defendant has right to have jury
consider only evidence adduced at trial); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (court
must secure concept that guilt is to be found only on basis of probative evidence). The
Court has a duty to protect the rights of the accused and only the Court can adequately
perform this duty. See United States v. Nelson, 498 F.2d 1247, 1248-49 (5th Cir. 1974) (arguments by counsel cannot replace instructions by judge).
43. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978).
44. See Carter v. Kentucky, -U.S.-, -, 101 S. Ct. 1112, 1121-22, 67 L. Ed. 2d 241,
253-54 (1981). See also People v. Harris, 218 N.W.2d 150, 150-51 (Mich. 1974). On the other
hand, if the jury obeys the court's instructions that an accused be found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt and precautions are taken to prevent the prosecution from exploiting a
defendant's silence, the instruction would not seem to be necessary to prevent the defendant's silence from being considered unfavorably by the jury. State v. Barker, 399 S.W.2d 1,
5 (Mo. 1966); see State v. Nelson, 303 N.E.2d 865, 868 (Ohio 1973).
45. Some courts have prohibited the jury instruction despite the good intentions of the
court in giving the instruction. See Green v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.2d 339, 341-42 (Ky.
1972); People v. Horrigan, 61 Cal. Rptr. 403, 406 (Ct. App. 1967). But see People v. Molano,
61 Cal Rptr. 821, 825 (Ct. App. 1967).
46. See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1978). There is a lack of empirical
evidence as to the ability of jurors to follow instructions limiting evidence. See generally 51
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In light of such uncertainty, a defendant should be allowed to make the
7
decision as to whether or not the instruction should be given.'
The Carter majority used the Lakeside rule, that the Constitution does
not forbid the failure-to-testify instruction, as a catalyst to determine
that the Constitution requires the trial judge to give such an instruction
when requested by a defendant.' 8 The government may, however, plausibly obtain an evidentiary advantage by giving a failure-to-testify instruction without the defendant's consent. The defendant, therefore, should be
given absolute discretion in determining whether or not the instruction
should be given.49 Such a rule will achieve a greater balance between the
government and the accused, and further eliminate the threat of wrongful
conviction.
Susan L. Gellis

L. REV. 264, 265 (1966). The University of Chicago used experimental juries and analyses of statistical data to test the actual effect of jury instructions. The conclusion taken
from an analysis of recorded deliberations and interviews of members of the jury was that
an instruction to disregard sensitized the jury to that evidence, rather than preventing the
jury from considering that evidence. See Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project,
38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 754 (1959); 51 MINN. L. REV. 264, 265 (1966); cf. Mengarelli v. United
States Marshal, 476 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1973) (problem raised by instruction is that it is
two-edged blade and jury in a particular case may react to either edge).
47. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 5 S.E.2d 156, 161 (N.C. 1939) (decision to forego instruction should be left up to defense); State v. Persuitti, 346 A.2d 208, 209 (Vt. 1975) (accused
should decide whether jury instruction is given); Champlain v. State, 193 N.W.2d 868, 873
(Wis. 1972) (defense may determine whether jury instruction is given as matter of trial
strategy).
48. Compare Carter v. Kentucky, -U.S... -,
101 S. Ct. 1112, 1121-22, 67 L. Ed. 2d
241, 254 (1981) (defense requested failure-to-testify instruction) with Lakeside v. Oregon,
435 U.S. 333, 337 (1978) (jury instruction given over defendant's objection).
49. See Green, The Failure To Testify Instruction, 14 WILL. L. J. 43, 53 (1977).
MINN.
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